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According to an influential dual-process model, a moral judgment is the outcome of a rapid,
affect-laden process and a slower, deliberative process. If these outputs conflict, decision
time is increased in order to resolve the conflict. Violations of deontological principles pro-
scribing the use of personal force to inflict intentional harm are presumed to elicit negative
affect which biases judgments early in the decision-making process.This model was tested
in three experiments. Moral dilemmas were classified using (a) decision time and consen-
sus as measures of system conflict and (b) the aforementioned deontological criteria. In
Experiment 1, decision time was either unlimited or reduced.The dilemmas asked whether
it was appropriate to take a morally questionable action to produce a “greater good” out-
come. Limiting decision time reduced the proportion of utilitarian (“yes”) decisions, but
contrary to the model’s predictions, (a) vignettes that involved more deontological viola-
tions logged faster decision times, and (b) violation of deontological principles was not
predictive of decisional conflict profiles. Experiment 2 ruled out the possibility that time
pressure simply makes people more like to say “no.” Participants made a first decision
under time constraints and a second decision under no time constraints. One group was
asked whether it was appropriate to take the morally questionable action while a second
group was asked whether it was appropriate to refuse to take the action.The results repli-
cated that of Experiment 1 regardless of whether “yes” or “no” constituted a utilitarian
decision. In Experiment 3, participants rated the pleasantness of positive visual stimuli
prior to making a decision. Contrary to the model’s predictions, the number of deonto-
logical decisions increased in the positive affect rating group compared to a group that
engaged in a cognitive task or a control group that engaged in neither task. These results
are consistent with the view that early moral judgments are influenced by affect. But they
are inconsistent with the view that (a) violation of deontological principles are predictive
of differences in early, affect-based judgment or that (b) engaging in tasks that are incon-
sistent with the negative emotional responses elicited by such violations diminishes their
impact.
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INTRODUCTION
A belief dating back to ancient times is that emotions cloud good
judgment. This adage implies a common sense belief that we
have two competing systems for making decisions, one based on
emotion and one based on reason. Recently, Greene (2007) pro-
posed a dual-process model which explains moral judgment as
the outcome of neurologically separable affective and deliberative
processes. According to this model, strong affective responses are
the domain of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC). Delib-
erative decision-making is subserved by the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex. When there is no prepotent affective response, deliberative
reasoning prevails. When a conflict between the outputs of these
areas occurs, it is detected by the anterior cingulate cortex, which
signals the need for cognitive control. This need is answered by
the anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; if the latter prevails, the
output of the deliberative system is selected. If not, the prepotent
affective response constitutes the judgment.
This dual-process explanation of moral judgment is con-
sistent with several decades of cognitive science research on
decision-making in other domains. Numerous researchers have
partitioned decisional processes into two competing systems, a
“System 1” that is quick and reflexive and a “System 2” that is
slow and deliberative (e.g., Gilbert, 1989; Sloman, 1996; Chaiken
and Trope, 1999; Hammond et al., 1999; Evans, 2003; Kahneman,
2003). According to these researchers, however, System 1 is not
solely the domain of emotion. Instead, intuition, heuristics, and
experience-based biases are also considered vital parts of the rapid,
reflexive System 1.
The singling out of emotion as the primary factor in early
moral judgment is based on two lines of evidence. The first line
depends on a theoretical commitment regarding the nature of util-
itarian and deontological decision-making. Utilitarian reasoning
judges the moral acceptability of an action based on its conse-
quences, seeking to maximize the “greatest good for the greatest
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number.” In contrast, consequences are irrelevant to deontologi-
cal concerns; instead the moral permissibility of an action depends
on its adherence to purportedly universal moral rules (categorical
imperatives). Greene et al. (2009) identified two particular deon-
tological principles which, when violated, elicit a high proportion
of deontological judgments. The first is whether the agent harms
the victim in a manner that involves personal force (use of an
agent’s muscles), and the second is whether the harmful outcome
is intended or an unavoidable side effect of the action taken. An
example of personal force would be pushing an individual onto
the path of an oncoming trolley. Pushing a switch instead which
diverts a trolley onto the individual’s path is impersonal. If divert-
ing the trolley was done in order to deliberately kill the person, it
is intentional harm. If instead, it was done to prevent the trolley
from killing five people in its path, it is a forsee but unavoidable
and unintended side effect. According to Greene et al. (2009), these
two factors, when combined, yield the highest level of moral con-
demnation. As the authors put it “. . .personal force was found to
interact with intention such that the personal force factor only
affects moral judgments of intended harms, while the intention
factor is enhanced in cases involving personal force.”
The second line of evidence consists of studies reporting acti-
vation of VMPC that is specific to moral judgments as compared
to semantic judgments or other non-moral judgments (Greene
et al., 2001; Moll et al., 2001; Heekeren et al., 2003). Importantly,
when reasoning about moral dilemmas that pit deontological prin-
ciples against utilitarian outcomes, individuals with damage to
ventromedial frontal cortex (and hence impaired socio-emotional
processing systems) are more likely to make utilitarian judgments
than intact individuals or patients with damage to other areas
of the brain. This outcome has been interpreted to mean that
moral judgment becomes more deliberation-driven when affect-
elicitation is impaired (Koenigs et al., 2007). Consistent with this
interpretation, Greene et al. (2008) found that requiring partic-
ipants to perform a concurrent digit-search task while making
moral judgments selectively increased decision time for utilitarian
judgments. They interpreted this to mean that it takes time and
cognitive resources to be a utilitarian.
One implication of this dual-process analysis is that early moral
judgments should be more affect-based while later ones should be
more reasoning-based, a crucial prediction tested by Suter and
Hertwig (2011) using dilemmas that pitted the welfare of a few
against the welfare of many. Participants were required to make
such moral decisions under unlimited-time or reduced-time con-
ditions, and three types of deontological violations were employed:
(a) high-conflict dilemmas, in which personal force was used to
intentionally inflict harm,(b) low-conflict dilemmas, in which per-
sonal force was used to inflict harm that was an unintended side
effect of the action taken, and (c) impersonal dilemmas, in which a
harm was a side effect and no personal force was used. They found
that restricting decision time reduced the number of utilitarian
decisions for high-conflict vignettes, but not for low conflict or
impersonal vignettes. These results are consistent with Greene’s
dual-process model because truncating decision time deprived
participants of the additional time needed to engage in deliberative
(utilitarian) reasoning and/or to resolve decisional conflicts.
While consistent with Greene’s dual-process model, several fac-
tors hamper interpretation of Suter and Herwig’s (2011) results.
First, the materials used were chosen because they differed in deon-
tological criteria yet all yielded low inter-subject consensus in pilot
work – each vignette elicited an equivalent number of “yes” and
“no” judgments. These selection criteria ignored the most impor-
tant factor in the fast vs. slow dual-process framework: decision
time. If a vignette elicits a high degree of conflict between the two
systems, then it should yield long decision times because it takes
time to resolve conflicting system outputs. Because people differ in
terms of how they choose to resolve the conflict, low inter-subject
consensus results. Yet consensus and decision times reported by
Greene et al., 2008, Supplementary Materials) did not necessarily
show this pattern. For example,“Crying Baby,”which involves both
personal force and intentional harm, yielded low inter-subject con-
sensus (60% utilitarian judgments) and long mean decision time
(5.7 s). But “Sophie’s Choice,” a dilemma that involves neither per-
sonal force nor intentional harm, also yielded low inter-subject
consensus (62%) and long mean decision time (6.1 s). In con-
trast, “Donation,” a dilemma that also involves neither violation,
yielded nearly identical low-inter-subject consensus (63%) but
rapid mean decision time (4.8 s). For this reason, decision con-
sensus may constitute an insufficient or misleading measure of
hypothesized inter-system conflict.
Second, reading time was not controlled by Suter and Hertwig
(2011) in a manner that ruled out the possibility that partici-
pants were devoting reading time to decision time. Participants
were given a maximum of 35 s to read each vignette before the
screen advanced to the decision question, yet no mention is made
of vignette word count. For this reason, it is not clear whether
decision time was held constant across vignettes.
These confounds were addressed in Experiment 1. Reading time
was controlled in a scrolling format, and two methods were used
to categorize vignettes as high or low decisional conflict. The first
method categorized vignettes based on the a priori deontological
factors proposed by Greene et al. (2009) and used by Suter and
Hertwig (2011). The second was entirely empirically based. The
dual-process model predicts that conflict between the two systems
lengthens decision time because the conflict must be resolved. It
also decreases inter-subject consensus because some people may
resolve in favor of System 1 outputs while others may resolve in
favor of System 2. Accordingly, high decisional conflict vignettes
were defined as dilemmas that elicit long decision times and low
inter-subject consensus. Conversely, low decisional conflict vignettes
were defined as those that elicit fast decision times and high inter-
subject decision consensus. Moderate decisional conflict vignettes
were defined as those that elicit moderate decision times and mod-
erate consensus. Decision time was manipulated, and the impact
of restricting decision time on moral judgment was assessed. The
model predicts that truncating decision time should preclude ade-
quate deliberative processing, thereby shifting the balance of the
judgments in favor of emotional outcomes. Because violations
of deontological principles are predicted to elicit rapid negative
affective responses, this means that early judgments should be
more deontologically based than later ones. Moreover, vignettes
that show long decision times and low inter-subject consensus
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should be exactly those that pit deontological outcomes against
utilitarian ones.
A third confounding factor was the conflation of content with
decisional processes, that is, the identification of deontology with
System 1 and utilitarianism with System 2. Because no direct mea-
sure of the two systems was employed, this confound is a particu-
larly serious one. In the materials employed by Suter and Hertwig
(2011), all “yes” responses constituted utilitarian judgments and
all “no” response constituted deontological ones. Matthews (2001)
has argued that stressors, such as restricting decision time, may
change the total quantity of decision-making resources available
due to changes in (a) biological or neural functioning, (b) pro-
cessing load (i.e., multiple tasks may overload the processing of
information), or (c) strategic reallocation of processing resources
(i.e., emotion-focused coping). An alternative interpretation of
Suter and Herwig’s (2011) results, therefore, is that reducing deci-
sion time simply made people more likely to say “no” in order to
cope with emotional or processing overload, not because they were
resolving in favor of deontological concerns. To test this alterna-
tive explanation, decision queries in Experiment 2 were worded
such that a “yes” or “no” response could be either a deontological
decision or a utilitarian decision. If Greene’s dual-process model is
correct, then the same results should obtain regardless of whether
“yes” or “no” constitutes a utilitarian response.
Finally, the impact of emotion was specifically investigated in
Experiment 3. A crucial aspect of the dual-process model proposed
by Greene and colleagues is the role of emotion in moral judgment,
not simply fast decisional processes. Emotion has been found to
impact moral judgments when people are given ample time to
make decisions, and the nature of the emotion elicited matters.
The elicitation of disgust has been found to create harsher attitudes
toward immoral behavior in general (Schnall et al., 2008), elicita-
tion of joviality or mirth makes deontological violations seem
more permissible (Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006; Strohminger
et al., 2011), and inducing feelings of “elevation” or benevolence
makes such violations appear less permissible (Strohminger et al.,
2011). Particularly relevant is the impact of stress on moral judg-
ment. Youssef et al. (2012) used the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST)
to induce stress (assessed by salivary cortisol levels). They found
that activation of the stress response yielded a reduction in util-
itarian responses that was specific to personal moral dilemmas
that described deontological violations. The reduction in utilitar-
ian judgments under conditions of time constraints (Suter and
Hertwig, 2011) or concurrent task demands (Greene et al., 2008)
may be simply due to the stress involved in conflict resolution.
To test this alternative explanation, participants in Experiment
3 read moral dilemmas and rated the pleasantness of esthetically
pleasing photographs prior to rendering a decision. Reflecting on
pleasant emotional stimuli is inconsistent with the hypothesized
negative affect elicited by deontological violations. Performance
of this group was compared to that of a control group who sim-
ply made decisions, and to a second control group who engaged
in a cognitive distraction task based on the same stimuli. If
deontological decisions are indeed strongly determined by rapid,
negative affective responses, then inducing a pleasant emotional
state during decision-making should decrease the frequency of
deontological judgments in favor of utilitarian ones.
EXPERIMENT 1
Greene’s dual-process model predicts that (a) early decisions
should be emotion based while later decisions should be reason-
based, and that (b) vignettes that describe deontological violations
should elicit more emotion-based judgments. The purpose of
Experiment 1 was to test these predictions. As in Suter and Her-
twig (2011), the utilitarian structure of all dilemmas was the same:
choose to sacrifice few to save many. They differed, however, in
terms of decisional conflict profiles and in terms of deontological
violations. Decision time was truncated for some subjects while
others were given unlimited time to make their decisions. It was
predicted that (a) vignettes whose decisional profiles are most
strongly consistent with a conflict between the fast and slow sys-
tems should also be those that are most strongly impacted by a
reduction in decision time, and (b) these same vignettes should
also be those that describe deontological violations, thereby yield-
ing strong emotional responses that are contrary to reasoned
utilitarian aggregate benefit analyses.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 189 undergraduate students at the University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign who participated in order to receive
class credit. Sixty-four percent were female, and all ranged in age
from 18 to 24. The median age for both females and males was 19.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
A total of 20 moral vignettes were used in the initial pool. Eighteen
were selected from the battery of vignettes used in Greene et al.,
2008, see the Supplementary Materials from that paper for decision
times and consensus). These were “Crying Baby,” “Footbridge,”
“Hard Times,”“Lawrence of Arabia,”“Sacrifice,”“Safari,”“Smother
for Dollars,” “Sophie’s Choice,” Standard Fumes,” “Standard Trol-
ley,” “Submarine,” “Transplant,” “Vaccine Policy,” “Vaccine Test,”
“Vitamins,” “Modified LifeBoat,” “Modified Bomb,” and “Dona-
tion.” In all of these moral dilemmas, an action that benefits “the
greater good” also has negative consequences for a minority of
individuals. The percent utilitarian judgments for these vignettes
ranged from 3 to 91%, and decision times ranged from 3 s to a little
over 7 s. Two additional vignettes were used which were designed
to elicit strong affect. “Cancer Toddler” was based on a dilemma
used by Hauser et al. (2006). It describes a situation where five
railway workers will die unless the participant redirects a runaway
train toward their own terminally ill child. “Fumes with Friends”
was a modification of the “Standard Fumes” vignette from Greene
et al. (2008). Here, participants must choose between allowing
toxic fumes to kill three hospital patients, or redirecting the fumes
to another room where they will kill their best friend. This brought
the total number of vignettes used to 20.
A custom E-Prime program was employed for the presentation
of instructions and vignettes, and for the collection of participants’
responses. A session began with instructions in which participants
were told they would be reading a series of stories and making
decisions about them. They were then given a practice vignette.
The order of the 20 experimental vignettes was randomized.
At the beginning of each trial, the computer displayed a white
screen with gray letterboxes at the top and bottom of the screen.
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A black plus sign was located in the center of the screen to serve
as a mask and to separate each trial. A counter indicating the
trial number was located in the top letterbox, and instructions
appeared in the bottom letterbox. Participants were instructed
simply to press a key when they were ready to begin reading the
first vignette.
Vignettes were presented as vertically scrolling text on the
computer screen. The gray letterboxing remained at the top and
bottom of the screen, creating a window in which the vignette text
appeared. Only 2.5 lines of text were visible at a time. This con-
trolled for reading speed by preventing participants from reading
too far ahead in the vignette. After the entire vignette had been
presented, participants were prompted to respond by the appear-
ance of text on screen asking,“Is it appropriate to [take the action]
in order to [produce the outcome]?” Participants indicated “yes”
by pressing the 1 key on the number pad, and “no” by pressing the
3 key on the number pad.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two condi-
tions. In the unlimited-time condition, participants were allowed
as much time as they wanted to respond. In the restricted-time
condition, decision time was abbreviated to 200 ms for each word
in the decision question, which resulted in an average of 4,400 ms.
If no response was given with this time period, the gray letter-
boxes turned red, the words “Respond Immediately” appeared
within both letterboxes, and two additional seconds were given
for participants to respond. After these additional 2 s expired, or
a response was recorded, a brief mask (a plus sign in the center
of the screen) marked the end of the trial. Decision times were
recorded at millisecond accuracy.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 presents percent utilitarian decisions (decision consensus)
and mean decision times for each vignette reported by Greene
et al., 2008, Supplementary Materials) and obtained under condi-
tions of unlimited decision time in Experiment 1, along with the
vignettes’ deontological features. In the present study, percent util-
itarian decisions ranged from 3 to 85%. There was nearly identical
agreement between our subjects and those of Greene et al. (2008)
on vignette decisions, r = 0.95, t (16)= 11.55, p < 0.001. Mean
decision times ranged from 2,830 to 7,605 ms. The correlation
between mean decision times in both studies for these vignettes
was lower but still statistically significant, r = 0.47, t (16)= 2.15,
p < 0.05.
VIGNETTE CLASSIFICATIONS
Given the moderate decision time correlation, we relied on deci-
sion times and consensus from our own subject population to
classify vignettes into decisional conflict categories.
The vignettes were divided into five categories based on deci-
sional conflict profiles as shown in Table 1. Starting from the
top of Table 1, these were the category divisions. Low Decisional
Conflict-No vignettes were those that elicited high “No” decision
consensus and fast decision times; this category included “Hard
Times,” “Transplant,” “Smother for Dollars,” and “Footbridge.”
Moderate Conflict-No vignettes were those that elicited moder-
ate “no” decisional consensus and moderately fast decision times;
these were “Sacrifice,”“Fumes with Friends,” and “Vitamins.” High
Decisional Conflict vignettes were defined as those that elicited low
decision consensus and long decision times; this category included
Table 1 | Vignettes used in Experiments 1 and 2 ranked by % utilitarian responses.
Vignette Personal Intention % Utila Dec. time (ms)a % Utilb Dec. time (ms)b
Hard times No Intend 3 4,089 9 5,262
Transplant Yes Intend 5 2,830 12 3,047
Smother for dollars Yes Intend 8 3,766 7 4,242
Footbridge Yes Intend 15 3,107 21 4,288
Modified safari No Intend 28 6,455 22 5,442
Sacrifice No Intend 28 6,588 51 6,139
Fumes w/friends No Side effect 36 7,706 n/a n/a
Vitamins Yes Side effect 38 5,602 35 6,352
Crying baby Yes Intend 40 6,366 60 5,651
Sophie’s choice No Intend 41 7,139 62 6,133
Cancer toddler No Side effect 52 7,366 n/a n/a
Standard fumes No Side effect 62 4,935 76 4,417
Donation No Side effect 67 7,606 63 4,830
Modified lifeboat Yes Intend 67 3,742 71 4,526
Lawrence of Arabia No Intend 68 4,904 82 6,881
Vaccine test No Side effect 68 4,941 79 7,125
Vaccine policy No Side effect 75 5,694 85 6,164
Standard trolley No Side effect 80 4,176 82 4,335
Submarine No Intend 80 4,709 91 5,983
Modified bomb Yes Intend 85 4,690 90 7,073
aResults from current study; bResults from Greene et al. (2008).
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“Crying Baby,”“Sophie’s Choice,” and “Cancer Toddler.” Moderate
Conflict-Yes vignettes were those that elicited moderate “Yes” deci-
sion consensus and faster decision times; these included “Standard
Fumes,” “Modified Lifeboat,” “Lawrence of Arabia,” and “Vaccine
Test.” Low Decisional Conflict-Yes vignettes were those that elicited
fast decision times and high “yes” decision consensus; these were
“Standard Trolley,” “Modified Bomb,” and “Submarine.” Three
vignettes that could not be classified according to these criteria
were excluded. They were “Modified Safari, “Vaccine Policy,” and
“Donation.”
DECISION CONFLICT ANALYSIS
Seven participants in the reduced-decision time condition were
eliminated because they did not enter a decision for two or more
vignettes. The remaining participants in this condition were able
to reach a decision in 99.3% of the remaining trials. Participants
therefore had ample time to reach a decision in the time allot-
ted, and presumably only extended deliberation was interrupted.
This strongly suggests that restricting decision time to 6 s did not
impose an onerous cognitive load. The relevant means were sub-
stituted for the 0.7% (n= 10 trials) that had missing data. The
resulting mean proportion utilitarian decisions are illustrated in
Figure 1.
These mean proportions were analyzed via mixed ANOVA
with decision time (Unlimited or Reduced) as a between sub-
ject variable and conflict (Low-No, Moderate-No, High, and
Moderate-Yes, Low-Yes) as repeated measures. The main effects
of decision time and conflict category were both signifi-
cant, F(1,182)= 9.37, MSe= 0.16, p < 0.005, η2= 0.05, and F(4,
728)= 277.42, MSe= 0.05, p < 0.00001, η2= 0.60, respectively.
These main effects were modified by a higher order interaction,
F(4, 728)= 3.91, MSe= 0.05, p < 0.005, η2= 0.02.
Planned comparisons indicated a pattern of results that differed
from Suter and Hertwig (2011). As predicted by the dual-process
model and as reported by Suter and Hertwig (2011), limiting
decision time significantly reduced the number of utilitarian deci-
sions in the High-Conflict condition, t (1,182)= 3.98, p < 0.0001
(two-tailed test), but had no impact on Moderate Conflict-No
and Low Conflict-No categories, t ’s(182)= 0.07 and 1.44, respec-
tively, p’s> 0.05 (two-tailed test). But unlike Suter and Hertwig
(2011), we found a significant reduction in “Yes” decisions in
both the Moderate Conflict-Yes and Low Conflict-Yes categories,
t ’s(182)= 2.03 and 1.95, respectively, p’s< 0.05 (two-tailed tests).
This suggests an across-the-board shift in strategy toward saying
“no” under time pressure.
Decision times were analyzed in order to ensure that time
restriction did in fact result in shorter decision times relative to the
unlimited-time condition. If it had no effect, this would invalidate
the intent of the manipulation, which was to reduce opportunity
for deliberation and/or conflict resolution. Decision times were
trimmed to eliminate times that equaled or exceeded 3 SD from
the mean within the appropriate Conflict×Decision Time cell.
This resulted in the elimination of 1.22% of the data. Remaining
mean decision times were calculated for each subject within each
decisional conflict category. These are presented in Figure 2.
Mean decision times were analyzed via mixed ANOVA
with condition (Unlimited or Reduced Time) as a between
subject variable and conflict (Low Conflict-Yes, Moderate
Conflict-Yes, High Conflict, Moderate Conflict-No, and Low
Conflict-No) as repeated measures. The main effect of deci-
sion time was significant, as was the main effect of con-
flict, F(1,182)= 107.67, MSe= 12,578, p < 0.0001, η2= 0.37, and
F(2,728)= 68.76, MSe= 2,188, p < 0.0001, η2= 0.27. The inter-
action of these variables was also significant, F(2, 728)= 22.96,
MSe= 2,188, η2= 0.11, p < 0.00001.
Planned comparisons indicated that people made quicker deci-
sion times in the reduced-time condition than in the unlimited-
time condition regardless of conflict category, t ’s(182)= 7.83,
8.57, 9.75, 7.07, and 7.60 for the Low Conflict-No, Moderate
Conflict-No, High Conflict, and Moderate Conflict Conflict-Yes
and Low Conflict-Yes categories, respectively, p’s< 0.0001. Hence,
people did indeed take longer to reach decisions in each conflict
condition – not just the High-Conflict category – when allowed to
take as much time as they wanted.
As is apparent from Figure 2, the pattern of decision times
is not entirely consistent with dual-process model predictions.
FIGURE 1 | Proportion utilitarian decisions made under unlimited- and
reduced-decision time for high-conflict vignettes (long decision times
and low inter-subject decision consensus), moderate conflict vignettes
(moderate decision times and moderate inter-subject decision
consensus), and low-conflict vignettes (fast decision times and high
inter-subject decision consensus) in Experiment 1.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean decision time for decisions made under unlimited- and
reduced-decision time for high-conflict vignettes (long decision times
and low decision consensus), moderate conflict vignettes (moderate
decision times and moderate inter-subject decision consensus), and
low-conflict vignettes (fast decision times and high inter-subject
decision consensus) in Experiment 1.
If utilitarian judgments require more deliberative thought, then
“yes” decisions should take longer than “no” decisions, and high
decisional conflict judgments should take the longest time of all
conflict categories. Looking first at the unlimited-time condition,
planned comparisons showed that Low Conflict-Yes decisions did
in fact take longer than Low Conflict-No decisions, t (91)= 7.45,
p < 0.0001, but the opposite was true for Moderate Conflict deci-
sions, t (91)=−5.61, p < 0.0001. Moderate Conflict-No decisions
took as long as High-Conflict decisions, t < 1. The same pat-
tern is apparent in the data published by Greene et al. (2008).
Mean decision time for vignettes that elicited the fewest utilitar-
ian decisions (“Hard Times,” “Transplant,” and “Smother”) was
4.18 s; for vignettes that elicited the greatest number (“Modified
Bomb,” “Submarine,” “Standard Trolley,” and “Lawrence of Ara-
bia”), mean decision time was 6.07 s. But for personal dilemmas
that elicited moderate decisional conflict, the opposite was true;
“no” responses required an average of 5.36 s (“Footbridge,”“Mod-
ified Safari,” and “Vitamins”) “yes” responses required an average
of 4.47 s (“Standard Fumes” and “Modified Lifeboat”).
Turning now to the reduced-time condition, Low Conflict-Yes
decisions required more time (M = 2.96) than Low Conflict-
No decisions (M = 2.10) t (91)= 10.71, p < 0.0001. Moderate-Yes
decisions (M = 2.85) took no longer than Moderate-No deci-
sions (M = 2.88), t < 1. High-Conflict decisions (M = 6.78) took
longer than any other decision [High vs. Low-Yes t (91)= 4.36,
p < 0.0001, High vs. Low-No t (91)= 12.89, p < 0.0001, High vs.
Moderate-Yes t (91)= 5.01, p < 0.0001, High vs. Moderate-No
t (91)= 5.08, p < 0.0001]. Thus, when decision time was trun-
cated – and deliberation thereby cut short – utilitarian decisions
tended to take longer than deontological decisions, and resolving
decisional conflicts took longest of all.
Summary of decisional conflict analyses
Reducing decision time lowered the proportion of “yes” decisions
for vignettes that usually elicit “yes” responses. It also lowered
the proportion of “yes” decisions for vignettes that normally elicit
nearly equivalent numbers of “yes” and “no” responses and hence
implicate high decisional conflict. Vignettes that typically elicit
“no” responses were unaffected by reductions in decision time.
This pattern of results is predicted by the dual-process model in
that saying“yes” is described as a utilitarian judgment that requires
deliberative reasoning. But decision time for “no” responses took
longer than “yes” responses when the vignette profiles indi-
cated moderate conflict. This is inconsistent with dual-process
predictions.
DEONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES
The results of the decision conflict analysis would be consistent
with the dual-process model proposed by Greene (2007) if two
conditions were true. First, deontological decisions must be rapid
ones, that is, they must be the domain of System 1. Second, a shift
in strategy from saying “yes” to saying “no” must reflect a strategic
change from taking time to resolve deontological and utilitarian
concerns to relying solely on fast deontological outputs.
A deontological analysis was conducted in order to test these
predictions. According to the dual-process model, vignettes that
described deontological violations (using personal force to inflict
intentional harm) should induce long decision times and low
decision consensus. This is because the fast, deontological sys-
tem outputs a “no” response while the slower, utilitarian system
outputs a “yes” response, and resolving the conflict takes time and
cognitive resources. In contrast, those that describe no such viola-
tions yield no such conflict, hence there is little need for time- and
resource-demanding conflict resolution. This was the reasoning
used by Suter and Hertwig (2011) when classifying vignettes as
“high” or “low” conflict.
As is apparent from the data presented in Table 1, participants’
decision times and decision consensus did NOT reflect differences
in deontological violations. “Crying Baby,” “Cancer Toddler,” and
“Sophie’s Choice” all showed low inter-subject consensus and long
decision times, yet only the first of these (“Crying Baby”) involves
personal force and intentional harm. Of the four vignettes that
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elicited the fastest “no” decisions, one involves neither type of vio-
lation (“Hard Times”); conversely, of the four that elicited the
fastest “yes” decisions, one described both types of violations
(“Modified Bomb”), one involved no personal force (“Subma-
rine”), and two described neither type of violation (“Vaccine
Policy”and“Standard Trolley”). This means that the deontological
criteria of personal force and intention were not entirely predic-
tive of decision time or inter-subject decision consensus. Other
unidentified factors apparently contribute to making decisions
slow or fast, difficult or easy.
To better assess the relationship between deontic violations
and decision profiles, two regression analyses were conducted.
Vignettes were assigned a score of 2 if both principles were vio-
lated (n= 6 vignettes), a score of 1 if only one principle was
violated (n= 6 vignettes), and a score of 0 if none were vio-
lated (n= 6 vignettes). (Impersonal vignettes “Donation,” and
“Vaccine Policy” were excluded.) The proportion utilitarian deci-
sions in the unlimited-time condition was then regressed onto
deontological score. The regression was not significant, F < 1,
adjusted R2=−0.02. Mean decision times were also regressed
onto deontological score, and this regression was also not signif-
icant, F(1,16)= 3.31, p= 0.09, adjusted R2= 0.12. Thus, factors
other than personal force and intention contribute to decision
consensus and decision times.
To test this more precisely, vignettes were re-classified into two
categories. The first included five vignettes that described the use
of personal force to inflict intended harm (PF-I): “Footbridge,”
“Lifeboat,” “Smother for Dollars,” “Modified Bomb,” and “Crying
Baby.” (“Transplant” was excluded as surgery did not seem to us to
involve personal force to the same degree as the others, even though
it is “up close and personal.”) Using Suter and Hertwig’s classifi-
cation scheme, these would constitute “High-Conflict Personal”
vignettes. The second category included five vignettes that clearly
describe actions in which the harm involved no personal force
and was a side effect rather than an intended outcome (NPF-SE):
“Standard Fumes,”“Fumes with Friends,”“Cancer Toddler,”“Stan-
dard Trolley,” and “Sophie’s Choice.” (“Donation” and “Vaccine
Policy” were excluded because they were not “personal,” “Hard
Times” was excluded because no death was involved, unlike all the
others, and “Vaccine Test” was excluded because it involves the
use of a syringe.) Using the classification scheme of Hertwig and
Suter, these would constitute “Low-Conflict Personal” vignettes.
The proportion utilitarian (“yes”) decisions were calculated for
each subject for these two sets of vignettes, and they are depicted
in Figure 3.
The dual-process model and the results of Suter and Her-
twig (2011) predict that these two categories should yield the
most divergence in decision consensus. Four planned compar-
isons were conducted to test these predictions. As predicted,
when participants were allowed to take as much decision time
as they wanted, more “yes”/utilitarian decisions obtained when no
deontological violations were described, mean NPF-SE= 0.54 vs.
mean PF-I= 0.43, t (91)= 3.64, p < 0.0001. When decision time
was reduced, however, no difference obtained, mean PF-I= 0.36
vs. mean NPF-SE= 0.39, t (91)= 1.21, p= 23. This was because
time truncation had less impact on vignettes that involved viola-
tions (0.43–0.46) than on vignettes that did not involve violations
(0.54–0.39), t (182)= 1.88, p= 0.03 (one-tailed test).
The same analysis was done on mean decision times, which are
depicted in Figure 4.
Contrary to dual-process predictions, when given as much
decision time as they wanted, participants took significantly less
time to render decisions for vignettes involving personal force
and intentional harm (M = 4.33 s) than for vignettes that did
not involve such violations (M = 6.19 s), t (91)= 7.29, p < 0.001.
When decision time was truncated, they still took less time when
deontological violations were involved (M = 2.45 s) than when
they were not involved (M = 3.17), t (91)= 9.23, p < 0.0001. Yet
these deontological violations should have put these vignettes in
greatest decisional conflict with their utilitarian properties.
Summary of deontological analyses
People quickly reject courses of action that require intentionally
harming someone through the use of personal force. When neither
FIGURE 3 | Proportion utilitarian (“Yes”) decisions made as a function of decision time (unlimited or reduced) for vignettes that involve the use of
personal force to intentionally produce harm and for vignettes that do no involve the use of personal force but yield harm as an unintended side
effect in Experiment 1.
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FIGURE 4 | Mean decision time for utilitarian (“Yes”) decisions as a
function of decision condition (unlimited or reduced-decision
time) for vignettes that involve the use of personal force to
intentionally produce harm and for vignettes that do no involve
the use of personal force but yield harm as an unintended side
effect in Experiment 1.
principle is violated, they require more time to make a moral
judgment. As a result, truncating decision time had a stronger
impact on vignettes that, according to Greene’s (2007) model,
require more deliberation and/or conflict resolution between con-
flicting deontological and utilitarian outputs. Decisional conflict,
however, could not be predicted solely on the basis of personal
force and intentional harm. Other vignette features appear to con-
tribute to decisional conflict as measured by decision time and
consensus. Moreover, conflicts between deontological and utili-
tarian outcomes yielded faster rather than slower decision times.
This pattern of results is consistent with two alternative decision-
making strategies: (a) saying “no” under time pressure or (b) using
deontological principles as heuristics.
EXPERIMENT 2
The results of Experiment 1 are inconsistent with Greene’s (2007)
claim that time is needed to overcome a prepotent emotional
response, but they are also consistent with two other explanations.
The first is that under time pressure, people are more likely to say
“no” to difficult dilemmas than they are to say “yes.” In the stud-
ies cited in our introduction and in Experiment 1 above, saying
“no” was not only equivalent to doing nothing, it also constituted
a deontological response. The apparent rise in deontological judg-
ments may have in fact have reflected nothing more than people
saying“with so little time to decide, I choose to do nothing.”Hence,
it was imperative to decouple “no” and “deontological judgment”
to see if people really were making more deontological judgments;
Experiment 2 addressed that confound, and ruled out that alter-
native explanation. The second is that deontological principles
constitute heuristic rules, allowing rapid decisions to be made,
and have little to do with emotion.
Experiment 2 addressed the first of these alternate explana-
tions – that decision time pressure yields a strategy shift toward
simply saying “no.” Participants again made moral judgments
under both unlimited-time and restricted-time conditions. They
were required to make a rapid response (within 6 s), and then were
given the opportunity to deliberate as long as they wanted. Half
of the participants were queried in a way that “no” responses were
consistent with deontological principles while“yes”responses were
consistent with utilitarian principles. The remaining participants
were queried in such a way that the reverse was true.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixty-five students at the University of Illinois served as partici-
pants in the study. They were recruited via advertisement on the
Psychology Department website, and were paid $5 for their par-
ticipation. Sixty-two percent were female, and ages ranged from
18 to 21.
MATERIALS
The same vignettes were used as in Experiment 1. The trial driver
consisted of a Qualtrics survey run on dedicated iMac computers.
The instruction screen stated the following:“Before each story, you
will see a prompt that says “READY?” and an arrow. When you are
ready to begin, click on the arrow, then place your cursor on the
X on the next screen. The story will begin 2 s after the X appears.
You will have 6 s to make your first decision about each story. IT IS
VERY IMPORTANT THAT YOU ENTER A DECISION WITHIN
THIS TIME FRAME. A timer will be displayed in the upper left
corner of the screen so you know how much time you have left.
You will then be given as much time as you need to enter a second
decision. The two decisions may end up being the same, or you
may decide you would like to change your mind.” The first deci-
sion prompt displayed the label “First Decision,” a count-down
timer, the question, and the choices “Yes” and “No.” Participants
entered their decision by clicking on one of the choices. If a deci-
sion was not made within the allotted time, the screen advanced to
the next screen. This screen showed the label “Second Decision,”
the question and the same choices.
The questions in the “Take Action” condition all took the fol-
lowing form: “Is it appropriate to <take the described action>
under the circumstances.” A “yes” response is consistent with a
utilitarian judgment, and a “no” response is consistent with a
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deontological judgment. The questions in the “Refuse to Take
Action” condition all took the following form: “Is it appropriate
to REFUSE to <take described action> under the circumstances?”
Here, a“no” response is consistent with a utilitarian judgment, and
a “yes” response is consistent with a deontological judgment.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
DECISIONAL CONFLICT ANALYSES
Vignettes were classified as in Experiment 1, and mean proportion
utilitarian decisions for each category were calculated. They are
depicted in Figure 5. Decision times were analyzed as in Exper-
iment 1. They were trimmed to eliminate times that equaled
or exceeded 3 SD from the mean within the appropriate Con-
flict×Decision Time cell. This resulted in the elimination of
1.85% of the data. Remaining mean decision times were calcu-
lated for each subject within each conflict condition. These are
presented in Figure 5.
These means were analyzed via mixed ANOVA with ques-
tion type (Take Action or Refuse to Take Action) as a between
subject variable; decisional conflict category (Low-No, Moderate-
No, High, and Moderate-Yes, Low-Yes), and decision trial (First
and Second) served as repeated measures. The main effect of
conflict category was significant, F(4, 252)= 98.30, MSe= 0.10,
p < 0.0001, η2= 0.61, and, as predicted, it was modified by a
significant interaction with trial, F(4,252)= 3.65, MSe= 0.02,
p < 0.006, η2= 0.06. Importantly, this interaction was not mod-
ified by question type, F < 1. This means that it did not matter
whether “yes” or “no” constituted a utilitarian judgment.
Planned comparisons indicated that, as predicted by the dual-
process model, limiting decision time significantly reduced the
number of utilitarian decisions in the High-Conflict condition,
t (1,64)= 2.72, p < 0.01 (two-tailed test). No other comparison
was significant. Given our within-subject design, this means that,
when given the opportunity to deliberate further, participants
changed their deontological responses to utilitarian responses
ONLY for high decisional conflict dilemmas.
The interaction of question type and trial was significant, F(1,
63)= 5.11, MSe= 0.03, p < 0.03, η2= 0.08. This interaction was
due to the “refuse to take” query form imposing a decisional load
separate from other factors. When asked whether to refuse to take
the stated action, participants increased their utilitarian decisions
from the first trial (M = 0.42) to the second (M = 0.47), simple
FIGURE 5 | Proportion utilitarian decisions made under unlimited- and
reduced-decision time for high decisional conflict vignettes, moderate
conflict vignettes, and low-conflict vignettes when the moral judgment
was queried as (A) “Is it appropriate to <take the described action>?” or
(B) “Is it appropriate to refuse to <take the described action>?” in
Experiment 2. A “yes” response constituted a utilitarian decision for the
former query, while a “no” response constituted a utilitarian decision for the
latter.
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effects F(1, 32)= 5.19, MSe= 0.01, p < 0.05. No increase obtained
when they were asked whether to take the action, M first= 0.46,
M second= 0.45, simple effects F < 1. This interaction was not
modified by conflict category, F < 1, indicating that the effect held
regardless of decisional conflict profiles.
Decision times were trimmed as in Experiment 2. Mean times
are presented in Figure 6.
Mean decision times were analyzed via mixed ANOVA with
question type (Take Action or Refuse to Take Action) as a between
subject variable, and trial (First or Second Decision) and conflict
category (Low Conflict-Yes, Moderate Conflict-Yes, High Conflict,
Moderate Conflict-No, and Low Conflict-No) as repeated mea-
sures. The main effects of conflict category and trial were both
significant, as was their interaction F(4, 252)= 10.07, MSe= 0.85,
p < 0.0001, η2= 0.15, F(1, 63)= 16.61, MSe= 3.13, p < 0.001,
η2= 0.21, F(4, 252)= 4.13, MSe= 0.63, p < 0.003, η2= 0.06,
respectively. The main effect of question type was NOT signifi-
cant, F < 1. This means that the results of Experiment 1 were not
due to a conflation of “yes”with utilitarian decisions and“no” with
deontological decisions.
Planned comparisons indicated that when decision time
was restricted on the first trial, people took longer to
make decisions about High-Conflict vignettes than for any
other type of vignette: High Conflict vs. Moderate Conflict-
Yes vignettes, t (64)= 6.23, p < 0.001, Moderate Conflict-No
vignettes, t (64)= 5.52, p < 0.001, Low Conflict-Yes vignettes,
t (64)= 5.14, p < 0.0001, and Low Conflict-No vignettes,
t (64)= 9.57, p < 0.001. When given the opportunity to reflect and
deliberate on the second trial, they spent more time thinking about
High-Conflict vignettes than they did Low-Conflict vignettes
regardless of final decision: Conflict-Yes vignettes, t (64)= 2.39,
p < 0.05; for Low Conflict-No vignettes, t (64)= 1.98, p < 0.05.
(There were no differences between the additional time taken for
High Conflict and Moderate Conflict-Yes or Moderate Conflict-
No vignettes, t ’s< 1.)
Summary of decisional conflict analyses
As in Experiment 1, people rendered fewer utilitarian judgments
for dilemmas that induce high decisional conflict when decision
time was truncated. When given more time, they were more likely
FIGURE 6 | Mean decision time for decisions made under
unlimited- and reduced-decision time for high-conflict vignettes,
moderate conflict vignettes, and low-conflict vignettes in
Experiment 2. First decisions were made within a time constraint of
6 s. Second decisions were made without time constraints. Moral
judgments were queried as (A) “Is it appropriate to <take the
described action>?” or (B) “Is it appropriate to refuse to <take the
described action>?” A “yes” response constituted a utilitarian decision
for the former query, while a “no” response constituted a utilitarian
decision for the latter.
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to change their deontological judgments into utilitarian ones. They
also required more time to make utilitarian judgments when deci-
sion time was truncated and when they were given unlimited time
to decide. These results held regardless of whether a “yes” or “no”
decision constituted a utilitarian judgment.
DEONTOLOGICAL ANALYSES
As in Experiment 1, vignettes were re-classified using personal
force and intention as discriminating features. A mixed ANOVA
was conducted on proportion utilitarian decisions using ques-
tion type (Take Action or Refuse to Take Action) as a between
subject variable, and decision time (Restricted and Unlim-
ited) and deontic classification (Personal Force+ Intention and
No Personal Force+ Side Effect) as repeated measures. The
analysis returned a significant interaction of trial and deon-
tic classification, F(1,63)= 8.18, MSe= 0.01, p < 0.01, η2= 0.12.
When people were given the opportunity to further deliber-
ate about dilemmas that did not violate deontological prin-
ciples, they reliably increased the number of utilitarian deci-
sions they made from 0.48 to 0.54, t (64)= 2.41, p < 0.025.
Having a second chance to think about their decisions had
no reliable effect, however, when the dilemmas violated deon-
tological principles, 0.51 vs. 0.49, t (64)= 1.35, p= 0.18. This
result would seem to suggest that deontological judgments are
either driven solely by application of heuristic rules or influ-
enced strongly by prepotent emotional responses, while utilitarian
decisions constitute outcomes of deliberative conflict resolution
processes.
The interaction of trial and question type was significant,
F(1,63)= 8.12, MSe= 0.02, p < 0.01, η2= 0.11. When asked
whether it was appropriate to refuse to take the stated action,
the proportion of utilitarian decisions increased with additional
decision time from 0.47 to 0.53, t (32)= 2.53, p < 0.025. When
asked whether it was appropriate to take the stated action,
allowing additional decision time had no reliable effect [0.51
for the first decision and 0.49 for the second, t (31)= 1.46,
p= 0.15].
Turning now to decision times, Figure 7 illustrates mean
decision times for first and second decisions as a function of
question type.
An ANOVA based on the same factors returned three
significant effects: the main effect of deontic classification
F(1,63)= 5.92, MSe= 0.38, p < 0.02,η2= 0.09, the main effect of
trial, F(1,63)= 28.20, MSe= 1.19, p < 0.0001, η2= 0.31, and the
main effect of question type, F(1,63)= 4.87, MSe= 2.12, p < 0.03,
η2= 0.07. These results meant that people took longer to make
decisions when the question asked whether to refuse to take action
(M = 3.02 s) than whether to take action (M = 2.62 s), they took
more time to make their first decision (M = 3.18 s) than to make
their second decision (M = 2.46), and to make judgments when
no deontological principles were violated (M = 2.91) than when
they were violated (M = 2.72). This last effect, again, is contrary
to dual-process predictions.
Summary of deontological analyses
The overall pattern of results indicate that (a) it is easier to think
about whether to take action than whether to refuse to take action,
and (b) dilemmas that violate deontological principles yield faster
decisions than dilemmas that do not. They also show that reduc-
ing decision time has greater impact on dilemmas that comprise a
conflict between fast and slow decisional processes such that fewer
utilitarian judgments obtain.
EXPERIMENT 3
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 clearly show dilemmas that
induce decisional conflict between deontological and utilitarian
principles impact decision time as well as decision consensus. Lim-
iting decision time shifts the decisional balance in favor of deon-
tological judgments, but these results do not necessarily implicate
the role of emotion in the deontological reasoning process. The
fast System 1 identified by Kahneman (2003) and others also
includes rule-based heuristic decision-making and intuition. The
fast deontological decisions our participants displayed may have
been due to the invocation of heuristic deontological rules, such
FIGURE 7 | Mean decision times for utilitarian and deontological judgments as a function of question type in Experiment 2. First decisions were made
within a time constraint of 6 s. Second decisions were made without time constraints.
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as never using a person as an object (as is done when using per-
sonal force) or never intentionally causing another being harm.
This is supported by the fact that deontological violations were
associated with faster decision times. As mentioned previously,
Youssef et al. (2012) found that activation of the stress response
yielded a reduction in utilitarian responses that was specific to
personal moral dilemmas that described deontological violations.
The reduction in utilitarian judgments under conditions of time
constraints (Suter and Hertwig, 2011) or concurrent task demands
(Greene et al., 2008) may be simply due to the stress involved in
conflict resolution.
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to investigate the separate
impact of emotion and cognition on rapid decisional outputs.
Participants made decisions under time constraints for a subset of
moral dilemmas that normally elicit distress. Midway through the
allotted decision-making time, one group of participants rated
photographs selected to elicit pleasant emotional states while a
second performed a cognitive task on the same photographs.
They then delivered their judgments. We predicted that shifting
attention to pleasant emotional stimuli would ameliorate emo-
tional stress thereby freeing up vital decision-making resources
and hence decrease the number of deontological decisions in favor
of utilitarian ones.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
PARTICIPANTS
One-hundred thirty-five undergraduate students at the Univer-
sity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign served as participants in the
study. Fifty-eight percent were female, and ages ranged from 18 to
21. An equal number (n= 45) participated in the control, emo-
tion rating, and cognitive task groups. Participants were paid $5
for their participation.
MATERIALS
Vignettes from the previous studies were selected for use based
on the following criteria: High and moderate decisional conflict
as evidenced by decision times and decision consensus, viola-
tions of personal force and intentional harm (PF-I), and no
personal force and harm as a side effect (NPF-SE). These criteria
yielded the following vignettes which served as materials: Cry-
ing Baby (High Decisional Conflict, PF-I), Sophie’s Choice (High
Decisional Conflict, NPF-SE), Vitamins (Moderate Decisional
Conflict-No, PF-I), Fumes with Friends (Moderate Decisional
Conflict-No, NPF-SE), Lifeboat (Moderate Decisional Conflict-
Yes, PF-I), and Vaccine Test (Moderate Decisional Conflict-Yes,
NPF-SE). In addition, “Modified Safari” served as an initial prac-
tice problem, and “Cancer Toddler” served as the last (unscored)
problem.
Distractor materials consisted of photographs of pleasant
houses in attractive landscaping. The houses differed in terms of
number of windows, ranging from 6 to 12.
PROCEDURE
The trial driver was a Qualtrics survey run on dedicated iMac com-
puters. A control group simply read each vignette and entered a
decision within a restricted-time period. The instruction screen
contained the following information: “You will read eight stories.
Before each story, you will see a prompt that says “READY?” and
an arrow. When you are ready to begin, click on the arrow, then
place your cursor on the X on the next screen. The story will begin
2 s after the X appears. It will scroll up through the window at a
comfortable reading rate.”
“When the story ends, you will have 4 s to think about it. A
timer will be displayed in the upper left corner of the screen so
you know how much time you have left. Lastly, you will be have
20 s to enter a decision about the story you read. The timer will
also be displayed.”Safari and Lawrence of Arabia served as practice
dilemmas, and were always the first second dilemmas displayed.
The remaining six dilemmas were presented in random order. The
questions asked were the same as the positive format questions in
Experiment 2. Participants entered their decisions by clicking on
either “yes” or “no” radio buttons.
The emotion group was given the following instructions: “You
will read eight stories. Before each story, you will see a prompt
that says “READY?” and an arrow. When you are ready to begin,
click on the arrow, then place your cursor on the X on the next
screen. The story will begin 2 s after the X appears. It will scroll up
through the window at a comfortable reading rate.”
“When the story ends, you will have 4 s to think about it. A
timer will be displayed in the upper left corner of the screen so
you know how much time you have left. Then you will see a pic-
ture of a house. You will be asked to rate the house in terms of how
pleasing you find it to be. You will have 10 s to give your rating, and
a timer will be displayed. Lastly, you will have 10 s to enter a deci-
sion about the story you read and a timer will be displayed.” The
house rating trials consisted of a color photograph of a house with
a rating scale beneath it. The scale consisted of radio buttons that
were labeled Very Unpleasant, Unpleasant, Somewhat Unpleasant,
Neutral, Somewhat Pleasant, Pleasant, and Very Pleasant. Partic-
ipants entered their decisions by clicking on a radio button that
reflected their judgment.
The cognitive group was given the following instructions: “You
will read eight stories. Before each story, you will see a prompt
that says “READY?” and an arrow. When you are ready to begin,
click on the arrow, then place your cursor on the X on the next
screen. The story will begin 2 s after the X appears. It will scroll up
through the window at a comfortable reading rate.”
“When the story ends, you will have 4 s to think about it. A
timer will be displayed in the upper left corner of the screen so you
know how much time you have left. Then you will see a picture of
a house. You will be asked to count the number of windows in the
house and multiply the total by three. You will have 10 s to record
your answer and a timer will be displayed. Count WHOLE win-
dows, not window panes. Count only windows that can be opened
as a unit.” This was followed by three photographs of multi-paned
windows captioned“This is counts as <> windows.”This was done
to ensure that no confusion would result in participants counting
window panes rather than windows. The instructions then contin-
ued.“Lastly, you will be have 10 s to enter a decision about the story
you read and a timer will be displayed.” Participants entered their
window answers by selecting from among four multiple choice
options.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
DECISIONS
The proportion utilitarian judgments for each condition is
depicted in Figure 8.
The proportion observed for the control condition was used as
the expected probability of a utilitarian response. If rapid, nega-
tive affective responses are primarily responsible for deontologi-
cal judgments, then disruption of negative emotional processing
through exposure to pleasant stimuli should reduce their number
relative to utilitarian judgments. This should be particularly true
for high decisional conflict dilemmas that pit deontic violations
against utilitarian concerns. In fact, the opposite obtained: For
the high-conflict dilemma that involved personal force and inten-
tional harm (Crying Baby), 40% of the control group (18 out of 45)
gave utilitarian judgments. In the emotion rating condition, 20%
(9 out of 45) gave a utilitarian decision, which constituted a sig-
nificant reduction in utilitarian judgments, Z=−2.59, p < 0.01.
In the cognitive condition, 45% (20 out of 51) gave a utilitar-
ian judgment, which did not differ from the baseline control,
Z =+0.45, p= 0.64. This pattern suggests that rapid judgments
for this type of dilemma are primarily driven by System 1, non-
deliberative processing, and that reducing or disrupting negative
affect processing make people more likely to render a deontological
judgment.
The same pattern of results obtained for the dilemma that did
not involve personal force or intentional harm (Sophie’s Choice).
Here, 58% (26 out of 45) gave a utilitarian response in the con-
trol condition. In the emotion condition, only 27% (12 out of
45) gave a utilitarian judgment, which also constituted a signifi-
cant reduction in such judgments Z =−4.11, p < 0.0001. Among
participants who engaged in the cognitive task, 49% (22 out of
45) gave a utilitarian judgment, which did not differ from the
expected proportion Z =−1.09, p= 0.27. Thus, inducing a pleas-
ant emotional state again shifted the decisional balance in favor of
deontological judgments.
Turning now to Moderate Conflict-Yes dilemmas, we found
the following. For the dilemma that violated the two deontologi-
cal principles (Lifeboat), 76% of the control group (34 out of 45)
gave utilitarian judgments, and neither the emotion (73%) nor the
cognitive manipulation (82%) yielded significant changes from
baseline, both Z ’s=−0.24 and+0.80, p’s= 0.42 and 0.78, respec-
tively. The same was true for the dilemma that did not involve
deontological violations (Vaccine Test); here 78% of the control
group (33 out of 45) gave utilitarian judgments. The percentages
for the emotion and cognitive task groups were 82% (37 out of
45) and 84% (38 out of 45), Z ’s=+1.23 and +1.56, p’s= 0.21
and 0.11, respectively.
Turning lastly to Moderate Conflict-No dilemmas, we found
the following. For the dilemma that violated the two deontolog-
ical principles (Vitamins), 49% of the control group (22 out of
45) gave utilitarian judgments, and neither the emotion (51%, 23
out of 45) nor the cognitive manipulation (56%, 25 out of 45)
yielded significant changes from baseline, Z’s=+0.13 and+0.73,
p’s= 0.89 and 0.46, respectively. For the dilemma that did not
involve deontological violations (Fumes with Friends), 40% of the
control group (18 out of 45) gave utilitarian judgments. Here,
again, neither the emotion nor the cognitive task impact judg-
ment values (emotion 49%, n= 22 out of 45, Z =+1.07, p= 0.28;
cognitive 40%, n= 18 out of 45, Z = 0, p= 1).
While the results of the decision analysis indicates the emotion
distractor task impacted high-conflict judgments, an alternative
explanation is that the groups differed in terms of the amount of
time they spent making decisions after they completed their tasks.
To rule out this possible explanation, decision times were analyzed,
and specific comparisons were made.
Decision times were analyzed via mixed ANOVA using distrac-
tor condition (Emotion, Cognitive, or Control) as a between sub-
ject variable, and vignette decisional conflict (High, Moderate-Yes,
and Moderate-No) and deontology (Personal Force+ Intention
and No Personal Force+ Side Effect) as repeated measures.
The main effects of distractor condition, decisional con-
flict, and deontology were all significant, F(2, 132)= 81.49,
MSe= 11.86,p < 0.0001,η2= 0.56; F(2,264)= 13.28 MSe= 7.08,
p < 0.0001, η2= 0.09; F(1, 132)= 7.62, p < 0.0001, η2= 0.17.
These main effects were modified by higher order interactions,
Distractor Condition×Conflict F(4, 264)= 4.70, p < 0.001,
FIGURE 8 | Proportion utilitarian judgments following an emotion rating
task involving pleasant stimuli, a cognitive task requiring mental
arithmetic, and a control group that involved neither in Experiment 3.
Dilemmas either involved the use of personal force to inflict intentional harm,
or no personal force where harm was an unintended side effect, and were
pre-classified as involving high or moderate decisional conflict.
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η2= 0.07; Distractor Condition×Deontology F(2, 132)= 14.51,
p < 0.0001, η2= 0.18.
Planned comparisons were conducted contrasting decision
times between the two distractor task groups for each vignette cat-
egory. (All tests two-tailed.) When deontological principles were
violated, participants took equally long to make decisions follow-
ing the emotion rating task and the cognitive task; the same was
true when deontological principles were not violated, all t ’s< 1.
Similarly, the type of distractor task did not differentially impact
decision times for High Conflict, Moderate Conflict-No, and Mod-
erate Conflict-Yes vignettes, t ’s< 1. This rules out the possibility
that differences in decision outcomes between the emotion and
cognitive groups were due to differences in the amount of time
spent on deliberation following completion of their respective
tasks.
Collapsing across distractor task, planned comparisons repli-
cated the results of Experiments 1 and 2: Participants once again
took longer to make decisions about vignettes that did not vio-
late deontological principles (M = 3.56) than vignettes that did
(M = 3.30) t (189)= 2.07, p < 0.05.
Participants took longer to render judgments for high deci-
sional conflict dilemmas (M = 3.98) than for moderate decisional
conflict dilemmas, Mod-No= 3.13, t (89)= 5.11, p < 0.0001;
Mod-Yes= 3.18, t (89)= 4.57, p < 0.0001. The moderate conflict
dilemmas did not differ from each other, t < 1.
Summary of decisional conflict and deontological analyses
This pattern of results indicates that (a) dilemmas whose consen-
sus and decision time profiles are consistent with high decisional
conflict were strongly influenced by emotional state, (b) exposure
to pleasant emotional stimuli decreased utilitarian judgments, (c)
the impact of emotion did not depend on whether deontologi-
cal violations occurred, and (d) the impact of emotion was not
due to changes in the amount of time spent in decisional pro-
cessing. These results suggest that reducing the stress involved in
resolving decisional conflicts between early deontological and later
utilitarian outcomes is responsible for shifting the balance in favor
of deontological judgments. This pattern of results is inconsis-
tent with the claim that prepotent negative emotional responses
elicited by deontological violations must be overcome in order to
render utilitarian judgments.
DISCUSSION
In these experiments, decisional conflict was defined in two ways,
(a) as a conflict between utilitarian and deontological principles,
and (b) as long decision times coupled with low inter-subject con-
sensus. The results of Experiment 1 showed that when decision
time was truncated, people rendered fewer utilitarian judgments
for dilemmas that induce high decisional conflict when defined
in either way. Experiment 2 replicated this effect and showed that
when given more time, they were more likely to change their deon-
tological judgments into utilitarian ones than vice versa. These
results held regardless of whether a “yes” or “no” decision con-
stituted a utilitarian judgment. This overall pattern of results is
consistent with Greene’s (2007) dual-process model of moral judg-
ment in which deontological judgments are the domain of a fast
System 1 process while utilitarian judgments are handled by a
slower, deliberative System 2. They also confirm the validity of
personal force and intentional harm as important deontological
principles in moral judgment.
Two findings were inconsistent with the predictions of the
model. First, the longest decision times should obtain when rapid
deontological judgments conflict with slower utilitarian judg-
ments. Yet such conflicts were associated with rapid decision times.
All dilemmas described the same utilitarian structure of harming
few to save or help many. Yet people were found to quickly reject
these actions if they also required intentionally harming someone
through the use of personal force. When neither personal force
nor intentional harm is involved, they took more time to reach a
decision.
Second, the results of Experiment 3 were not consistent with
the involvement of emotion in deontological judgments. Accord-
ing to the model, deontological violations elicit strong negative
affect which biases the judgment outcome toward rejecting the
proposed course of action described in the dilemma – contrary
to utilitarian concerns. Reducing negative affect therefore should
have increased the frequency of utilitarian judgments. Instead, the
opposite obtained: Exposure to pleasant emotional stimuli was
found to decrease utilitarian judgments for high decisional conflict
dilemmas, regardless of whether the dilemmas involved deonto-
logical violations. This result suggests that the stress of decisional
conflict is the crucial factor that interferes with deliberative rea-
soning, not the negative affect that is induced by deontological
violations. This leaves open the possibility that deontological judg-
ments may be described more as a rapid, heuristic process than an
emotion-driven one.
Our results also show that, decisional conflict cannot be pre-
dicted on the basis of deontological violations as was done by Suter
and Hertwig (2011) and others. Dilemmas whose decisional pro-
files reflected long decision times and low inter-subject consensus
were not necessarily the same ones that involved deontological
violations, nor were dilemmas that boast rapid times and high
utilitarian consensus necessarily the same ones that were free of
deontological violations. Other factors seem to be responsible for
at least some of these decisional conflict profiles. For this reason,
caution should be observed when defining dilemmas as “high” or
“low” entirely theoretically, without taking empirical decisional
profiles into account.
It should be noted that our results are not inconsistent with
dual-process explanations of moral judgment in general. Our
experiments were designed to test a specific dual-process model –
the model proposed by Greene et al. (2001) and Greene (2007).
According to that model, when deontological principles are vio-
lated, fast negative affect is evoked which must be overcome by
slower deliberation. Our results are inconsistent with this aspect
of the model: The presence or absence of violations of deonto-
logical principles was not predictive of differences in early, affect-
based judgment (Experiments 1 and 2), and diminishing negative
emotional affect led to more deontological judgments, not fewer
(Experiment 3).
Most importantly, these results are relevant to teasing apart
the separate contributions of intuition, emotion, and heuristic
processes in moral judgment. Each of these typically yield rapid
decisional outputs. Previous research suggested that utilitarian
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judgments may be decreased by inducing disgust (Schnall et al.,
2008), stress (Youssef et al., 2012), or “elevation” (benevolence;
Strohminger et al., 2011). Conversely, making light of deontolog-
ical violations by making them seem funny increases utilitarian
judgments (Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006; Strohminger et al.,
2011). Our results add to this literature by showing that expo-
sure to pleasant emotional stimuli dramatically reduces utilitarian
judgments, while inclusion of a cognitive task did not impact
moral judgments. This suggests that the impact of the emotion
task was not due to simple stress reduction. Instead, the type or
quality of the emotion elicited appears crucial to moral judgment
outcomes.
Our results are also inconsistent with the predictions of theories
which treat emotions as epiphenomena which play no substan-
tive role in moral judgment (Rawls, 1971; Cushman et al., 2006;
Hauser et al., 2006). Haidt (2001, 2007) has proposed that moral
judgments are primarily fast, intuition-based judgments, and rea-
soning occurs only later to justify a judgment already made. Our
results show that moral judgments do indeed occur quite rapidly,
but the results of Experiment 2 show that these rapid judgments are
frequently reversed upon more reflection. The most accurate inter-
pretation of our results appears to be the moral judgment involves
both fast and slow decisional processes, and that early emotional
responses play an important role that is not yet well understood.
Our results seem to indicate that person-based considerations
often weigh more heavily in moral judgment than principle-based
considerations. What seems to be most influential is victim char-
acteristics, as seen in Table 2. Of the vignettes logging fewer than
65% utilitarian decisions, almost all of the victims belonged to a
vulnerable class (i.e., child, patient, injured innocent) or had other
characteristics that would elicit a compassion response (i.e., fat
man, fellow hostage). Of the eight vignettes that logged greater
than 65% utilitarian decisions, five had characteristics that would
lessen compassion because danger or risk is part of their posi-
tion (i.e., terrorist’s son, combatants, workmen, soldier, and fellow
passenger) and two did not involve fatal harm. (The primary dif-
ference between “fellow hostage” and “fellow passenger” is that the
former had no choice in becoming a hostage while the latter chose
to enter the lifeboat.) This interpretation is consistent with other
studies that have reported victim characteristics to weigh in moral
judgment. For example, Cikara et al. (2010) found that intergroup
biases and stereotypes weigh heavily on neural systems implicated
in moral decision-making.
From this viewpoint, factors that elicit greater compassion for
the victim or put the decision-maker in an emotional state that is
conducive to compassion will decrease their willingness to impose
harmful consequences on the victim, hence decreasing the likeli-
hood of a utilitarian response. Our data indicate that this person-
assessment process takes place rapidly in System 1, and results in
affective responses that are primarily expressed in terms of degree
of compassion for the victim. Harms to a vulnerable person are
seen as a greater harm than harms to those less vulnerable. This is
a utilitarian concern. If correct, then the identification of deonto-
logical judgments with a rapid, affective response and utilitarian
judgments with a slower, deliberative response is not warranted.
Instead, both deontological and utilitarian heuristics may be part
of the System 1 process. Fast responses to these vignettes can obtain
Table 2 | Victim characteristics of vignettes ranked according to %
utilitarian decisions.
Vignette % Utilitarian Victim
Hard times 3 Child
Transplant 5 Patient
Smother for dollars 8 Patient
Footbridge 15 Fat man
Modified safari 28 Fellow hostage
Sacrifice 28 Child
Fumes w/friends 36 Injured friend
Vitamins 38 Patient
Crying baby 40 Child
Sophie’s choice 41 Child
Cancer toddler 52 Child
Standard fumes 62 Injured innocent
Donation 67 n/a
Modified lifeboat 67 Fellow passenger
Lawrence of Arabia 68 Combatants
Vaccine test 68 Patients
Vaccine policy 75 n/a
Standard trolley 80 Workman
Submarine 80 Soldier
Modified bomb 85 Terrorist’s son
simply by applying a extremely simple “greater good” heuristic
(i.e., always choose that action that maximizes the number of lives
saved, regardless of victim characteristics), or by applying a deon-
tological heuristic (e.g., never use a person as a means to an end).
The deliberative aspect of a dual-process account involves the care-
ful weighing of the outcomes of these heuristics, particularly when
a conflict among the outputs occurs.
We tested an influential theory that explains moral judgment
as the outcome of parallel rapid affective and slower deliberative
processes. People were required to make decisions about moral
dilemmas that involved harming some in order to save many. These
dilemmas were selected on the basis of previous research to vary in
terms of the gravity of the harm and hence the degree of affective
response elicited. We found that restricting decision time (in order
to limit time available for deliberation and increase task stress)
had little impact on judgments that induced little decisional con-
flict, but significantly decreased the proportion of decisions that
were consistent with deliberative aggregate benefit analyses for
dilemmas that induced high conflict. We also found that requiring
people to rate the emotional pleasantness of visual stimuli in a dis-
tractor task similarly decreased the proportion of utilitarian-type
moral judgments. These results are consistent with the predic-
tion that truncating decision time shifts decision profiles in favor
of weighting affective features of the dilemma more heavily than
their utilitarian structures.
Our findings are directly relevant to three other papers
published in this volume. The work reported by Henderson
et al. (2012) indicates that exposure to moderate, controllable
stress benefits performance, but exposure to uncontrollable stress
or having a more extreme response to stress tends to harm
performance. The analysis provided by Kanske (2012) suggested
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that stress can be leveraged in order to benefit performance. But we
found induction of even moderate stress through restricting deci-
sion time had a pronounced affect on moral judgments. Finally,
Trübutschek and Egner (2012) demonstrate that previous reports
of emotion-modulated trial–transition effects are likely attrib-
utable to the effects of emotion on cognitive control processes.
Similarly, our results indicate that affective processes can strongly
impact decisional profiles in predictable ways.
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